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I. ART HHAS SCIENCE
Treating art as a science would either bash the distinction between the two or
be a contradiction in terms. We may compare art with science, but must not
understand it as science. In my view, modern science brought subjectivity
into trouble, whereas art itself has the subjective as its main motivating force.
For one, narrative arts like novels, theatre plays, and films tell stories, and
are acclaimed for conveying the subjective aspect of events. Next, artistic
creativity, whether in music, or indeed in any art form, aims at regulating
the appreciative experience. Lastly, to assess a work’s artistic merit is to look
for the artist’s achievement, which involves looking for the way they realised
their intentions with their audiences. It is thus that one wants to say that
art is concerned with the subjective, and that one wants to distinguish it
sharply from how sciences treat their subject matters. Science aims for quan-
tification and universalisation, applying its objectivist methodologies while
conveying the thought that all knowledge hangs together—and that it be ob-
jectivist. In the Enlightenment, our world view was not only mechanised but
also objectified. Art and aesthetics responded by dedicating themselves to
the subjective.
Art is not a science: no art is turned redundant by successive developments
in art; the arts do not form a logical whole, though art practice forms a
pragmatic whole; no art form consists as a quantifiable whole, but presents a
phenomenological set of specifications for artists and spectators; no work of
art forms a quantifiable whole, and none can be paraphrased without serious
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loss. The loss would be the subjective aspect. The logic of art, if one insists
on using such a term, is sui generis artistic and involves ample reference to
the subjective. What is at stake with a work of art is the subjectivity of the
appreciation of the beholder, and of the achievement of the maker.1
The history of modern aesthetics has, in different ways, taught this view.
In Aesthetica, Alexander Baumgarten considered art to be a means for amelio-
rating perception so as to make it more lifelike, and extensively clear. He took
science to be moving away from the singularity of perception for the sake of
producing intensive deductive knowledge.2 Immanuel Kant argued in his Cri-
tique of Judgement that the core of the aesthetic is the subjective, aesthetic,
appreciative experience, both in aesthetic judgement and in the exemplary
creations of genius.3 He did not treat the subjective dismissively, but as based
in judgement, and as, therefore, communicable.4 We tend to treat the subjec-
tive negatively nowadays, because we equate it with the idiosyncratic, because
we adhere to a reductive, scientific world-view. Kant distinguished aesthetic
judgements, like Hume before him, from mere individual preferences.5 They
defended an aesthetic normativity that is not amenable to logical truth or
moral principle. Moreover, Kant deemed the subjective, its communicable
variety, as the precondition of our Geselligkeit, our sociability, and as such as
grounding morality—a view that we find in Richard Wollheim, as well.6
Phenomenologists recognised the centrality of art and its experience for
phenomenological analyses.7 Often, works of art can be viewed as present-
ing the audience with the phenomenology of some perception. For instance,
photos come to mind—think of Henri Cartier-Bresson’s “Behind the Gare
Saint-Lazare”, 1932, of a man jumping over a pool of water, showing him
hanging in mid-air. The photo shows something that someone witnessing the
event should have seen, but probably did not—because the photo shows us a
frozen moment of a movement.
One must wonder exactly what phenomenological analysis this photo
presents us with. People perceive movements, but not frozen moments within
a movement—only a camera does. The photo seems to suggest that one does
see frozen moments like this—one merely does not consciously register it. The
phenomenological suggestion is, however, more of a question than a claim: do
we really also see these frozen moments when we see movement? Someone
might view the photo as verification of a causal theory of perception that
understands perception as the processing of data caused by light reflecting
on an object. But perhaps we can construe the photo as a claim about the
very difference between human perception and camera registration. A theory
of perception, more viable than the causalist one, treats perception as part
of our understanding of the world. Yes, our perceptual organs must have met
these objective data, the light waves and frozen moments, but these are not
things that we are able to perceive.8 Perception, in this sense, is subjective:
something veridical someone does. Perception is something a person does,
not his sub-personal modules.9 Nor is perception a set of fixed snap shots,
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let alone a single one of these.10 Cartier-Bresson’s photo merely shows that
cameras register the world unlike how humans perceive it—and the evidence,
one could say, invites a phenomenological analysis everyone should be capable
of making.
The friction between science and the subjective is also clearly at stake
in The Dialectics of Enlightenment. Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer
argue here that the sciences attempt to understand the world and everything
in it in objective terms, and in doing this, they intentionally exclude the con-
crete particular, the singular. Adorno and Horkheimer recount and interpret
a scene from Homer’s Odyssey where Odysseus, forewarned by Circe, has
himself tied to the mast, while his rowers, their ears plugged with bees’ wax,
row past the island of the Sirens, allowing Odysseus to enjoy their beautiful
singing without being capable to land and be captured by the Sirens. In the
view of Adorno and Horkheimer this story models how scientists are required
to restrict their own person to produce operationable insights through exper-
iments that can be repeated by everyone who is likewise willing to restrict
their subjectivity to reduce the impact of the context of discovery, in favour of
the context of legitimation where the deductions have their place. According
to Adorno, the net result of this is that the concrete particular itself—read:
subjectivity, art, individuality—becomes the other of scientific knowledge.11
Sheryl Tuttle Ross and Aaron Golec argue, in this issue, that according
to Adorno and Horkheimer “the full-force dedication to the ideals of reason
which permeates every aspect of contemporary life creates the grounds for
totalitarian regimes or at the very least for a culture that is rationally assim-
ilated and authoritarian.” They also argue that contemporary culture indus-
try does not produce the individual’s freedom as modern rationality claims.
The antidote would be laughter, but not the terrible variety known from our
responses to culture industry, but a reconciled variety. Such ephemereal lib-
eration may be the best response available to the monolithic rationality of
modern science.
II. WHICH SUBJECTIVITY?
But subjectivity has acquired a bad name. Many will think of the internet
where everyone can say whatever they like—present their preferences at will,
whether these are upbuilding or downgrading.12 But art is not about that
type of subjectivity: not about our idiosyncratic preferences, but about the
shareable kind of subjectivity that forms the centre of perception. And the
idiosyncratic is not all bad either, by the way—it is merely irrelevant for
artistic appreciation. What then is wrong with the idiosyncratic type of
subjectivity? For one, idiosyncratic subjectivity is not easily shared, if at all,
because it is caused, and caused by some singular event, and there is no way
to establish the measure in which it suits the situation that caused it, nor
does there seem much need for such norms of correctness. The idiosyncratic
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is not normative.
For the pride that we feel for our idiosyncratic memories this is not a
problem: we simply know of ourselves that we hold these preferences, and they
motivate us to experience value and to lead our lives. The cognitive and moral
principles that we hold merely guide our actions—our power of judgement
decides the choices that we should make. We sorely need the idiosyncratic for
bringing back memories that cannot be retrieved otherwise, not by reasoning
or by active retrieval, but randomly. Our associations confront us with the
reality of our own histories. Thus, we may have forgotten all about certain
events, when one day we pass a bush with a typical scent, which brings out
all sorts of idiosyncratic feelings and images from back then; and this may
make us realise what type of person we were then, which things happened in
our lives in those days, who were there with us, and so on. The idiosyncratic
forms an invigorating thread in one’s life.
For the person that we are this is of major importance. We may come to
realise this the moment when a demented person is lost to us. They lose their
connections with this idiosyncratic subjectivity: when seeing their daughter
these idiosyncratic memories no longer pop up randomly. Others can tell them
who this woman is, relate all the stories they have available about her and
about the things the demented must have gone through with their daughter,
and so on, but all this knowledge will not help the demented—unless it rings
true subjectively. And the subjectivity required is of the idiosyncratic kind.
It cannot be made available through suitable prompting.13
But the idiosyncratic is also the ground for our preferences, and prefer-
ences hold some sort of normative sway over us, and over others—unwarranted.
Aesthetic preferences are very unlike aesthetic judgements, as Kant argued
clearly. We can enjoy a Willem de Kooning for the large planes of pink in it
because we have a preference for the colour of pink, but this will not—and
should not—bring other people who think nothing of the painting to view it
as a great painting. You cannot explain what the perception of pink consists
in to begin with, let alone why you have a preference for it.14 A preference
is idiosyncratic, which is how, and why it is irrelevant in normative matters.
If, on the contrary, one were to point at the manner in which the pink daubs
control the other colours in the painting, how they bring the turmoil of the
brown, blue and red daubs to a calm, then this does potentially allow others
to see the painting as you see it, because your critical appreciation of the
colours is based in a judging of its effects. What is important is: others too
can point you to things happening in the painting to make you abandon your
appreciative judgement.15
It is the latter type of subjectivity that art is concerned with. Artists
make their works to mobilise a certain subjectivity in their audiences, and
audiences seek it out by finding what the artist intended with their work, such
as can be perceived out there—these perceptions we can share amongst each
other. Art teaches us to converse about these things, to engage in public
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critical dialogue about the artistic merit of some corpus of works, or some
film, or performance, as we do abundantly. And, to be clear, such a debate
is nothing like the unbounded ventilating of preferences that we find on the
internet, nor is it like a scientific, or moral argument.16
The importance of art may lie in that we have to live our own lives, and
this is a subjective and tragic process—as Aristotle viewed this in his Poetics.
Life is a process led by a person who picks their plans for future actions on the
basis of their views and desires. In each of these components something may
go wrong and when a person realises this they will scrutinise morally their
views, desires, actions and plans, in relation to their future behaviour.17 The
predictions and assumptions that sciences produce may, at best, function like
Delphi’s oracle, acting like self-fulfilling prophecies. It is not that science—or
morality—tells us what to do in life.
III. AESTHETIC NORMATIVITY
In his later work, Ludwig Wittgenstein often discusses how we understand
language by comparing this with how we understand works of art—or facial
expression. The appreciative challenge with a literary passage is not: to
produce a singularly best interpretation (or to describe the face to explicate
its expression). We assess the meaning of a passage by reading out with the
right expression, to whistle a tune in the right manner, where the rightness is
audible; not something we might be able to think of in a principled scientific
manner.18 Empirical science has no say in issues of aesthetic normativity.
This is exclusively the domain of the subjective, and of art, as well as of
aesthetics done rightly. Several contributions to this issue deal with this.
We often assume that a work of art, especially a good one, all of its
own, tells its beholder of its meaning and expression, but Erik Schmidt asks
what happens to the appreciator in the event a work remains puzzling: what
does one see, what does one’s imagination do? Schmidt discusses works by
Rauschenberg and Kafka to show how in some cases we have little control
over imaginative engagement. Soraya Vasconcelos presents the artistic pro-
cess as a disembodiment strategy: the materials chosen by the artist already
have meaning in more normal constellations, but the artist reshuffles them
to create a new one in the work. Where does one find this new meaning,
but in the dark? More or less in accord with the above characterisation, Ste-
fan Niklas suggests a new view of the so-called ‘Age of Aesthetics’, linking
it to Eckart Förster’s notion of intuitive understanding. What is aesthetic
certainty? Niklas speculates towards an answer to that question.
Kai-Uwe Hoffmann, in his discussion of thick aesthetic concepts, drawing
on work done by Frank Sibley and Nick Zangwill, develops a view of how con-
textual considerations precede the selection process of thick aesthetic concepts
and which normative demands are at stake there. Christopher Duarte Araujo
and Paul Elias argue that instead of two flawed interpretations of Marx’s aes-
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thetics, Marx’s central view attributes to art an important role in allowing
individuals to fully realise their creative capacities and aesthetic sensibilities.
In a ‘communist society’, wrote Marx and Engels, ‘there are no painters, but
only people who engage in painting among other activities’. Should we adore
Marx more or less for this? Well, Leon Culbertson and Graham McFee might
object to such distinction bashing. They revive David Best’s views on sport
by arguing against appreciating sport merely, in my terms, from the point
of view of the subjective: purposive sports remain centrally aimed at certain
ends, even when they are judged aesthetically.
IV. ART AND SUBJECTIVE TRUTH
Art is not challenged to tell the truth about how things are in the world out
there. Art is not journalism any more than it is science. For that reason,
it makes little sense to hold truths about the world against mistakes against
them as are found in fictions. Plato took the importance of art in this cogni-
tive manner, but was corrected by Aristotle’s view that factual mistakes were
only minor mistakes in a work of fiction, whereas mistakes against a work’s
proper aims were the important flaws: to begin as a tragedy and end having
your audience laugh out loud is such a grave mistake. And Hume said:
“Where any innocent peculiarities of manners are represented, [. . . ]
they ought certainly to be admitted; and a man, who is shocked with
them, gives an evident proof of false delicacy and refinement. [. . . ] But
where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another,
and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with
the proper characters of blame and disapprobation, this must be
allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity.”19.
Hume argued that we can tolerate factual mistakes in fiction, but might refuse
to engage in a story that presents us with a society holding immoral views.
Two contributions in this issue can be mapped against this background of the
cognitive value of works of art.
Marie-Luise Raters defends Hegel’s conception of art as appropriate for the
modern secular work of art, where the criterion of a meritorious work of art is
the adequate physical embodiment of mind. Of course, for Hegel, a successful
work of art expresses or adds to our view of the world. I only add, from my
point of view, that the measure of adequacy is due to a subjective experience.
Rafe McGregor argues that some films, such as Memento and Blade Runner,
produce a type of knowledge about the world—they are cognitive instruments.
The view I defend in this editorial is that these works teach us what it might
be like to live in a world such as is presented in these films. We would have
to look at the world too, to check whether things said fit it, for these things
to count as cognitive insight, and that is something other than appreciation
of the film—something extra one might also want to engage in, or not.
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Fiction is alone in offering knowledge of a kind different from truths to
external, objective facts. What art—narrative arts such as literature and
film included—offers its audiences is something the spectator or reader can
check against themselves, during the appreciative process. Such checking is
part of what appreciation consists in. I am referring to something Descartes
mistakenly took to be the foundation of our scientific knowledge: the certainty
that having some mental state proves it real. Hence the paradox view that we
should be capable of gathering true knowledge about the world from fiction
as we do from journalism. But the mental states that we are so certain about
are the idiosyncratic subjective states that we cannot possibly share with
others—we can only convey them. They are not aesthetically normative.
Two things might have been claimed instead. First, what we know so
clearly and distinctly is the idiosyncratic subjectivity accompanying some
insight—the core of our personal identity—but not the insight. And secondly,
the type of knowledge produced here concerns the psychological plausibility
of events, as they are experienced by the protagonists.
Is this why Hume thought one would refuse to engage in fictions presenting
immoral societies: because this conflicts with our feelings about psycholog-
ical consistency? We cannot experience the psychological reality of such an
immoral system: it is not us we are reading about. It makes no sense to try
to read a book from the point of view of a lion—or a bat, to connect these
views to Thomas Nagel’s argument.20 Some subjectivities are just too far off.
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NOTES
1. For the latter, Wollheim’s chapter on indi-
vidual style is convincing; Wollheim 1993a.
Wollheim neatly discusses the classifica-
tions of art history as external to things
we are interested in with art, such as a
work’s expression, and the artist’s style.
2. Baumgarten 2007, §§ 1-22. Baumgarten
presented aesthetics as a science of percep-
tion, but notwithstanding recent efforts to
restore that idea; and reading how Baum-
garten elaborates his position shows us
that he was not after a deductive, ob-
jectivist reduction of the subjective ele-
ments in perception—but, instead, after
what makes our perceptions grand, exten-
sive and lively.
3. See Kant 1987, § 40:6, resp. § 46:3.
4. See Kant 1987, § 13:3.
5. See Kant 1987, §§ 14 and 39.
6. Kant 1987, and Wollheim 1993b.
7. See the works of Roman Ingarden, Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty, and Mikel Dufrenne.
Hans-Georg Gadamer argued likewise for
the hermeneutical experience, in Gadamer
1976, 1986a, and 1986b.
8. Without technological help, by a micro-
scope, for instance. The issue illustrates
Zeno’s paradoxes. The arrow, of course,
reaches its aim; Achilles, of course, wins
his contest with the tortoise. Movement is
not a set of still moments—not in real-life,
nor, even, in cinema, where some have ar-
gued that the movements that we see on
the screen is an illusion, produced by the
speed with which singular images are pro-
jected onto it, and that our eyes are inca-
pable of discerning.
9. See John McDowell 1994.
10. See Alva Noë 2006.
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11. See Adorno 1997, and Adorno and
Horkheimer 2002.
12. Especially the negative stories seem to
have most influence on subsequent “de-
bates”. Perhaps, we assume that rational-
ity will defend itself—and if it does not
then in that measure it shows its weakness.
13. See Wollheim 2001 for the notion of suit-
able prompting.
14. See Kant 1987, §§ 14, and 39.
15. Again, see Wollheim 2001.
16. See van Gerwen 2004.
17. See Wollheim 1984 for this view of life as
a process.
18. “A man may sing a song with expres-
sion and without expression. Then why
not leave out the song—could you have
the expression then?” Wittgenstein 1946,
29:2. “‘Look at a face—what is important
is its expression—not its colour, size, etc.’
[. . . ] The expression is not an effect of
the face—on me or anyone. You could not
say that if anything else had this effect,
it would have the expression on this face.”
Wittgenstein 1946, 30:3.
19. Hume 1757
20. See Nagel 1979a and 1979b.
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